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NOTHING IS REAL:  PROTECTING THE REGULATORY VOID THROUGH 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY INACTION 
 
Robert L. Glicksman* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The provisions of the United States Constitution that define the roles of the 
national and state governments have always been a subject of interest and debate.  In the 
1990s, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, began reexamining a 
variety of important federalism doctrines.1  The Court’s docket included cases raising 
significant questions about the degree to which the Constitution authorizes or constrains 
action by each level of government.  Some of the cases required identification of the 
scope of federal power, most notably the federal legislative power under the Commerce 
Clause.2  Others dealt with the manner in which provisions of the Constitution such as the 
Tenth Amendment3 constrain federal legislative power.4  The Court also addressed the 
extent to which the Eleventh Amendment5 immunizes the states from suits by private 
individuals for violations of federal law6 and the impact of the dormant Commerce 
Clause7 on state regulatory authority.8 
                                                 
*
 Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar, Center for Progressive 
Reform.  The author thanks his colleague, Richard E. Levy, for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and 
Ashlea Schwarz, University of Kansas School of Law, Class of 2007, for her valuable research assistance. 
1
 See Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the National and State Governments 
in the American Federal System:  A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 973 (1997) (asserting that “there 
is no disputing that the current Supreme Court is more interested than any Court in recent history in 
reexamining and reconsidering ‘first principles’ of our federal system”); Stephen R. McAllister & Robert 
L. Glicksman, State Liability for Environmental Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court’s “New” Federalism, 
29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10665, 10665 (Nov. 1999) (claiming that, “[d]uring the 1990s, the 
‘Rehnquist’ Court has revived debate about the fundamental principles of American federalism”). 
2
 U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  The Court also relied on its reading of 
the Commerce Clause to assist it in interpreting the scope of agency authority under federal statutes.  E.g.., 
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  For commentary on the Court’s recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, see A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme 
Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); 
Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, The 
Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995); 
Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in 
Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199 (2003). 
3
 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
4
 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  For commentary on the Court’s recent Tenth Amendment cases, see 
Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Requisition 
Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMM. 355 (1998); Richard E. Levy, New York v. 
United States: An Essay on the Use and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the 
Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993). 
5
 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
6
 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Sav. Bd. v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bd., 
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 Another constraint on the exercise of state power derives from the Supremacy 
Clause, which is the source of the doctrine of federal preemption.9  That doctrine 
provides an important piece of the federal-state power allocation puzzle.  Federal 
preemption law is important due to both the frequency with which it is raised and the 
impact it has on the availability of state law.  According to one source, “preemption . . . is 
almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitutional law in practice.”10  In 
addition, the preemption doctrine is a critical aspect of the interplay between federal and 
state lawmaking authority because “nearly every federal statute addresses an area in 
which the states also have authority to legislate (or would have such authority if not for 
federal statutes).”11 
 
The Supreme Court has not neglected the preemption doctrine during its recent 
efforts to rethink, and in some cases reconfigure constitutional federalism.  The Court has 
found that federal regulatory statutes preempted state statutes or administrative 
regulations.12  It has held that federal statutes preempted state common law remedies.13  
                                                                                                                                                 
527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  For commentary on the sovereign 
immunity cases, see Jonathan Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 397-402, 431-33 (2005); Hope Babcock, The Effect of the United States 
Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 
83 OR. L. REV. 47 (2004); McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 1. 
7
 The Commerce Clause on its face contains an affirmative delegation of authority to Congress to regulate 
activities involving interstate and international commerce.  The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted 
that provision as imposing implicit constraints on state activities that discriminate against interstate 
commerce.  United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 
1792 (2007)  (explaining that “[a]lthough the Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States to 
regulate commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state 
authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute”). 
8
 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of 
Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 91992); Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).  For analysis of 
the Supreme Court’s recent dormant Commerce Clause cases, see Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National 
Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection and State Autonomy, 73 
N.C. L. REV. 1481 (1995); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (2003); Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice and the Interstate 
Garbage Wars, 70 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1997); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not 
“Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153 (2005). 
9
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution and “the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall by the supreme Law of the Land,” notwithstanding state laws to the 
contrary). 
10
 Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994). 
11
 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000). 
12
 See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 
(1992).  But cf. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (holding that federal pesticide 
legislation did not preempt local ordinance applicable to pesticide applications). 
13
 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).  Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that federal tobacco legislation preempted some state common 
law causes of action but not others).  In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), the court 
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The Court has identified federal administrative regulations that have the same effect.14  
The Court’s interest in preemption has caught the eyes of legal academics, who in the last 
few years have generated a rich and extensive literature on the normative and doctrinal 
components of preemption law.  Recent scholarly inquiries have dealt with issues such as 
the extent to which federal agency interpretations of the preemptive effect of the statutes 
they administer are entitled to judicial deference,15 whether agency statements of 
preemptive intent found in regulatory preambles should be given effect,16 the propriety of 
the adoption of anti-preemption rules of statutory construction,17 and the role of 
preemption doctrine in product liability litigation.18 
 
What many of these cases and articles have in common is their focus on the extent 
to which some kind of action by the federal government has the capacity to preempt state 
statutes, regulations, or common law theories of liability.  The preemption doctrine has 
the potential to sweep even more broadly, however, than situations involving affirmative 
federal activity such as the adoption of statutes or administrative regulations.  On 
occasion, even the federal government’s failure to act has been deemed sufficient to 
preclude state governments from pursuing regulatory initiatives or adjudicating common 
law tort actions seeking redress for harms caused by the defendants’ activities.  Little 
attention has been paid in the academic literature to the propriety of this federal 
preemption by inaction. 
 
 The purpose of this article is to identify when inaction by either Congress or a 
federal regulatory agency should be deemed to preempt state law.  This inquiry has 
important implications for the values reflected in our federal system of government, just 
as the resolution of preemption issues involving affirmative federal conduct does.  But 
judicial recognition of preemption by inaction poses particular difficulties for the 
intended beneficiaries of the preempted state law regimes, such as those designed to 
protect the public health, the public safety, or the environment.  If a court finds that 
federal legislative or administrative failure to act preempts state regulation, the activities 
that prompted the state (through its legislative, executive, or judicial branches) to create 
some kind of protective regulatory or liability mechanism will of necessity become 
completely unregulated.  That result may have significant adverse consequences for 
health, safety, or welfare or the environment, the traditional focal points of the exercise of 
the state’s police powers. 
 
 This article uses a timely and important reference point to illustrate what is at 
stake when federal inaction is alleged to preempt state law through:  the battle over the 
                                                                                                                                                 
held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, did not preempt 
various fraud, breach of warranty, design defects, and related claims. 
14
 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 501 U.S. 597 (2000). 
15
 See, e.g., Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
16
 Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 277 (2007). 
17
 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
18
 See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. REV. 
725 (2006); David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005). 
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authority of the states to regulate activities that contribute to global climate change in 
light of the federal government’s largely sluggish response to the environmental and 
health risks posed by climate change.19  Part II of the article sets the stage for the 
normative analysis that follows.  The first subsection of Part II describes the federal 
legislation potentially applicable to the regulation of activities that contribute to global 
climate change as well as the litigation that has raised the prospect that ongoing and 
future state regulation of those activities is preempted by federal law.  The second 
subsection of Part II briefly summarizes the tests enunciated by the Supreme Court to 
determine whether federal law explicitly or implicitly reflects the federal government’s 
intent to preempt state law. 
 
Based on the framework for analyzing preemption questions described in Part II, 
Part III identifies the circumstances in which the federal government’s failure to act 
creates the potential for preemption of state law, explicit or implicit, and analyzes in each 
situation whether preemption by inaction is justifiable as a normative matter.  It also 
analyzes the degree to which federal agencies which have declined to act under 
legislation vesting in them the authority to do so may affect the preemption result reached 
in court through their interpretations of the allegedly preemptive federal statutes.  Finally, 
the article inquires whether state law should ever be preempted in a situation in which the 
federal government lacks the authority to address the subject of state regulation.  The 
article illustrates the potential impact on the allocation of regulatory power between the 
federal government and the states of each component of the preemption principles urged 
in Part III by applying them to the global climate change context. 
 
Part III sets forth four basic recommendations for the resolution of preemption 
problems, one of which is directed at Congress and rest of which are directed at the 
courts.  First, in deference to state prerogatives in areas of traditional state concern, 
Congress should not preempt state regulation in areas in which it has chosen not to 
regulate unless it first determines either that a state’s regulatory initiative would 
inappropriately impose adverse impacts on other states or that federal policies can best be 
achieved in the absence of positive regulation at any level of government.  Second, in the 
absence of federal regulatory action, the courts should never find implied preemption 
based on occupation of the regulatory field in which the state is engaged.  Third, the 
courts should find implied preemption in the absence of federal regulatory action based 
on a conflict with federal objectives only if Congress has explicitly delegated to a federal 
agency the power to preempt state law to prevent it from subverting federal goals and the 
agency has clearly, authoritatively, and persuasively exercised that authority.  Fourth, the 
courts should never find implied preemption of state law if the federal actor involved 
lacks jurisdiction over the activities being regulated by the state.  If the courts are willing 
to consider preemption in such circumstances, they should afford no deference to agency 
                                                 
19
 For discussion of the federal government’s lethargy in addressing the climate change problem, see Robert 
L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Sea 
Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1127, 1159-70 (2006) (discussing the federal 
government’s “sins of omission”).  For an argument that California’s regulation of mobile sources of 
pollutants that contribute to climate change should not be preempted because that regulation has the 
potential to contribute to environmental innovation, see Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 (2003). 
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statutory interpretations that bear on the degree of displacement of state law arising from 
the allegedly preemptive statute.  These recommendations strike an appropriate balance 
between federal and state power, while minimizing the risk that preemption of state law 
will create a regulatory void that creates unacceptable risks to health, safety, or the 
environment. 
 
II. SETTING THE STAGE 
 
 The next part of this article explores the degree to which preemption by federal 
inaction is appropriate in a variety of situations.  It applies the principles of preemption 
urged there to the concrete example of global climate change to illustrate how those 
principles would affect the allocation of regulatory power between the federal and state 
governments in an important area of current legal controversy.  The function of this part 
is to provide necessary background discussion.  First, this part describes the allocation of 
authority between the federal government and the states under existing law to regulate 
activities that contribute to global climate change.  Second, it summarizes the familiar 
array of categories in which the Supreme Court has recognized that federal law may 
preempt state law.  As indicated below, preemption may be either express or implied, and 
there is more than one basis for finding implied preemption. 
 
 A. Global Climate Change and Federal Preemption by Inaction 
 
The potential implications of allowing federal inactivity to preempt state 
regulation are well illustrated by the preemption-based attacks that have been made on 
the constitutionality of state efforts to regulate activities that contribute to global climate 
change.20  In 2004, a state regulatory agency, the California Air Resources Board, 
adopted regulations restricting emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from motor vehicles.21   
A coalition of motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers, an automobile trade association, 
and a county farm bureau sued the state, seeking to invalidate the regulations.22  The 
plaintiffs argued, among other things, that California’s regulations are preempted by 
section 209(a) of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).23  That provision declares generally 
that no state shall “adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of 
                                                 
20
 For discussion of a model for determining whether federal environmental laws provide a legitimate basis 
for preempting state environmental regulation that is based on analysis of the justifications for federal 
environmental regulation, see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, Preemption and the Purposes of 
Federal Regulation, __ N.W. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming). 
21
 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961.1(e)(4). The agency issued the regulations pursuant to authority delegated 
to it under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43098.5(a). 
22
 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006).  The district court 
denied the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the CAA preemption issue.  Id. at 1174-75.  See 
also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2005 WL 2709508, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct 20, 2005), 
reconsideration denied, 2005 WL 3470653 (E.D. Cal. Dec 19, 2005) (describing the plaintiffs’ complaint 
as “very verbose”). 
23
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
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emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to”24 the 
provisions of the CAA that relate to motor vehicle emissions and fuel standards. 25 
 
Despite this prohibition, Congress has long allowed California to regulate motor 
vehicle emissions, “in recognition of the unique problems faced by California as a result 
of its climate and topography,” especially with respect to ozone pollution in southern 
California.26  Congress believed that California had “compelling and extraordinary 
circumstances” that make California “sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole to 
justify standards on automobile emissions which may, from time to time, need [to] be 
more stringent than national standards.”27 Accordingly, the CAA authorizes the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to waive the prohibition on state regulation of 
motor vehicle emissions found in section 209(a) for California if the state’s standards are 
“at least as protective of public health as any applicable federal standards”28  In addition, 
EPA must find that the state standards are necessary “to meet compelling and 
extraordinary circumstances” and “are not inconsistent with” section 202(a) of the 
CAA.29  That provision requires EPA to issue standards restricting motor vehicle 
emissions which, in the judgment of EPA’s Administrator, “cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”30  
The plaintiffs in the California climate change litigation argued that, because EPA has not 
issued a waiver allowing California to adopt standards to control CO2 emissions from 
motor vehicles, the state’s regulations are subject to the general prohibition of section 
209(a) and are therefore preempted. 
 
The argument that the CAA preempts the California regulations restricting CO2 
emissions would seem to present a relatively straightforward, albeit important issue of 
statutory preemption, but for one additional fact:  EPA has not regulated emissions of 
CO2 from motor vehicles under the CAA.  Indeed, at the time the plaintiffs sued 
California, EPA, in denying a petition filed by several states and environmental groups 
requesting that EPA regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from motor vehicles, had 
taken the position that it lacked the authority to do so under the CAA because GHGs do 
                                                 
24
 Id. 
25
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7554.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the California regulations are preempted by the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a), the statute that authorizes the 
Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue 
corporate average fuel economy standards.  That argument involves preemption by federal regulatory 
action rather than inaction, and is therefore beyond the scope of this article.  In any event, the argument was 
weakened considerably when the Supreme Court concluded that regulations limiting CO2 emissions from 
motor vehicles (in that case, by the federal Environmental Protection Agency) would not be inconsistent 
with federal fuel economy standards.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1461-62 (2007).  Finally, the 
plaintiffs in the California litigation alleged that state regulation of CO2 emissions was preempted by the 
national government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.  That component of the preemption attack on 
California’s regulatory program is also beyond the scope of this article.  For further discussion of the issue, 
see Notes, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1877 (2006). 
26
 See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1958. 
27
 H.R. Rep. No. 90-148 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1956.   
28
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
29
 Id. 
30
 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
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not qualify as air pollutants under the statute.31  According to the plaintiffs in the suit 
challenging the California emission controls: 
 
EPA concluded that section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act does not authorize regulation of 
carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases because Congress never intended that such 
emissions be considered “pollutants” for purposes of section 202(a). . . .  [The state’s] 
regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would certainly not be 
“consistent with” section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, either on the face of the statute or 
as interpreted by EPA.  Congress never intended to permit California to present the issue 
of global climate change . . . as a "compelling and extraordinary" condition in California 
that would permit California to adopt its own emission standards, unlike every other state 
in the nation.32 
 
In addition and in the alternative, EPA had also stated in denying the states’ 
petition that, even if it had the authority to regulate GHGs under section 202 of the CAA, 
it would refuse to exercise it.  In particular, EPA provided several policy-based reasons 
for refusing to regulate.  First, regulation under § 202 of GHG emissions from new motor 
vehicles, which are one of many sources of those GHGs, would “result in an inefficient, 
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue.”33  Second, unilateral regulation by the 
United States of motor vehicle emissions might weaken efforts to persuade developing 
countries to reduce their own GHG emissions.  Third, ongoing research into scientific 
uncertainties about the causes and effects of global climate change and into possible 
technological solutions made regulation premature.  Fourth, with respect to one of the 
remedial mechanisms suggested by the petitioners (improved tire efficiency), EPA raised 
doubts that it has the authority under the CAA to regulate tire efficiency as an “emission” 
of an air pollutant.34 
 
The petitioning states and environmental groups sought judicial review of EPA’s 
refusal to regulate GHG emissions under section 202 of the CAA.  In 2007, the Supreme 
Court held that EPA does indeed have the power to regulate GHG emissions under the 
CAA and that the policy-based reasons EPA enunciated in its denial of the petition for 
refusing to do so were arbitrary and capricious and insufficient to justify its refusal to 
regulate.35  Despite that decision, EPA has still not regulated any GHG emissions under 
the CAA.36 
                                                 
31
 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines; Notice of Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
32
 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 2004 WL 
2846142 (Dec. 7, 2004), at ¶ 81. 
33
 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines; Notice of Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
34
 Id. at 52,929-31.  The petitioners failed to suggest any actions that EPA could take to reduce emissions of 
other GHGs, including CH4 and N2O from motor vehicles.  Id. at 52,931. 
35
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
36
 In May 2007, President Bush issued an executive order enunciating a federal policy “to ensure the 
coordinated and effective exercise of the authorities of the President and the heads of the Department of 
Transportation, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency to protect the 
environment with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, nonroad vehicles, and nonroad 
engines, in a manner consistent with sound science, analysis of benefits and costs, public safety, and 
economic growth.”  Exec. Order No. _____, § 1 (May 14, 2007), available at 
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Pending issuance of mandatory controls on GHG emissions either by Congress or 
EPA, a victory for the plaintiffs in the California climate change preemption litigation 
therefore would make it impossible for any state to regulate GHG emissions, leaving 
motor vehicle emissions completely unregulated.  Given the consensus of mainstream 
scientific opinion that GHG emissions contribute to climate change – recognized by the 
Supreme Court in its 2007 decision37 − this regulatory void is likely to pose threats to 
public health and the environment that at least some states deem worthy of immediate 
regulatory attention. 
 
The combination of the federal government’s refusal to regulate GHGs and the 
contention made by the auto industry that the CAA nevertheless preempts state efforts to 
regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles raises the following question:  When, if 
ever, is it appropriate for the federal government to preclude regulatory initiatives such as 
California’s efforts to control CO2 emissions, despite its unwillingness to tackle the threat 
targeted by state regulation on its own? 
 
B. The Traditional Framework for Analyzing Preemption Issues 
 
The Supreme Court has established a familiar framework for analyzing 
preemption questions, even if it has not always applied the framework in a consistent 
fashion.38  The Court has indicated that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200705/20070514-1.html.  The Order does not require any 
federal entity to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles by any specified date.  In announcing the 
promulgation of the Order, the President stated that “[t]his is a complicated legal and technical matter, and 
it’s going to take time to fully resolve.”  President Bush Discusses CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards, 
available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html.  Federal regulation of 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles apparently is not imminent. 
37
 The Court began its opinion in Massachusetts as follows: 
 A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase 
in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  Respected scientists believe that the two 
trends are related.  For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling 
of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 U.S. at 1446.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in 
2007 that “it is extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past 50 years can be explained without 
external forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone.”  IPCC, 2007: Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.  Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers 10 (Solomon et al. 
eds., 2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/wg1-report.html.  
38
 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes:  Supreme Court 
Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 968 (2003-2004) (stating that “Supreme Court 
preemption jurisprudence is in a terrible state.  Lower courts are both confused and frustrated because the 
Court's recent preemption decisions have been neither clear nor consistent.”); Jennifer S. Hendricks, 
Preemption of Common Law Claims and the Prospects for FIFRA:  Justice Stevens Puts the Genie Back in 
the Bottle, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 65, 66 (2004) (stating that “[t]he history of preemption doctrine . 
. . is a history of doctrinal confusion and frequent changes of course”); Mason A. Barney, Note, Not as Bad 
as We Thought:  The Legacy of Geier  v. American Honda Motor Company in Product Liability 
Preemption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 949, 949 (2005) (describing preemption doctrine as “a powerful, 
confusing, and controversial area of federal law”). 
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touchstone of pre-emption analysis.”39  The most obvious way for Congress to manifest 
its purpose to oust state law is to preempt state law explicitly in the text of the statute.  
Express preemption occurs when the statutory language itself provides that state law is 
preempted.  The Court has indicated that “[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of 
pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing 
that issue, and when that provision provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent 
with respect to state authority,’ . . . ‘there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-
empt state laws from the substantive provisions’ of the legislation.”40  The reviewing 
court’s task in a case involving express preemption is to “identify the domain expressly 
pre-empted by” the relevant federal statute.41 
 
According to the Supreme Court, “analysis of the scope of the pre-emption statute 
must begin with its text,” but judicial interpretation of an express preemption provision 
“does not occur in a contextual vacuum.  Rather, that interpretation is informed by” a 
judicially created presumption against preemption.42  The Court has described the 
presumption and its rationale as follows: 
 
First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long 
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt [state law].  In all pre-emption 
cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”43 
 
The presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations is relevant not 
only in determining whether preemption has occurred at all.  The Court has also declared 
it appropriate to rely on the presumption “to support a narrow interpretation of . . . an 
express [preemptive] command. . . .  That approach is consistent with both federalism 
concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.”44  
The Court also has stated that, in defining the scope of an express preemption provision, 
                                                 
39
 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
40
 Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); California Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282  (1987)). 
41
 Id. 
42
 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
43
 Id. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  See also Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (stating flatly that “[c]onsideration under the Supremacy Clause starts 
with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law”); City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (stating that, in assessing whether federal law preempts state common 
law, the Supreme Court “begins ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not 
to be superseded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’”). 
The Court’s adherence to the presumption against preemption has not been consistent, however.  
See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (refusing to apply the 
presumption against preemption in the context of policing fraud against federal agencies because the field 
was not one involving traditional state regulation and “the relationship between a federal agency and the 
entity it regulates is inherently federal in character [and] the relationship originates from, is governed by, 
and terminates according to federal law”). 
44
 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
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the courts must rest mainly on congressional purpose, which “primarily is discerned from 
the text of the preemption provision and the statutory framework surrounding it.  In 
addition, a court resolving express preemption challenges should consider the ‘structure 
and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed not only in the text, but through the 
reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the 
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the 
law.”45 
 
 Even if a federal statute does not explicitly preempt state law, it may do so 
implicitly.  The Court has recognized two types of implied preemption, occupation of the 
field and conflict preemption.  With respect to the first form of implied preemption, the 
Court has “recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law . . . when the 
scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field 
exclusively.”46  Implied preemption based on conflict occurs where either it is impossible 
for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or state law “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”47  In assessing whether state law represents an obstacle to the pursuit of 
federal objectives, “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed 
by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects.”48 
 
The various categories of preemption are not airtight and mutually exclusive.49  
More than one form may apply to a given preemption inquiry, and the distinctions among 
the various forms of implied preemption are not always clear.50  The Court has 
recognized, for example, that even if an express preemption provision does not cover a 
particular state law, that law may still be implicitly preempted.51 
 
Despite the potential for overlap and confusion among the various categories of 
preemption, Part III analyzes the impact of federal inaction on the preemption of state 
law by reference to each of the traditional categories discussed above:  express 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 486 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 908). 
46
 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
47
 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citation omitted) (stating that preemption may occur “by implication from the depth 
and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field or by implication because of a 
conflict with a congressional enactment”). 
48
 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
49
 Id. at 372 n.6 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (stating that “the 
categories of preemption are not ‘rigidly distinct’”). 
50
 Id. (citing Gade, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992) (“noting similarity between ‘purpose-conflict pre-emption’ 
and preemption of a field, and citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486 (2d ed. 1988)); 1 L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that ‘field’ preemption may fall into 
any of the categories of express, implied, or conflict preemption”)). 
51
 See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (recognizing the validity of a theory that 
state law that is not expressly preempted might nevertheless be preempted by the entire statute); Geier v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (stating that the presence of either a savings clause or an 
express preemption provision “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles,” such 
as implicit conflict preemption). 
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preemption, implied preemption by occupation of the field, implied preemption due to 
physical impossibility, and implied preemption due to frustration of federal objectives. 
 
III. THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO ACT 
 
 The general framework sketched out above for analyzing whether federal law 
preempts state law does not distinguish between those situations in which the allegedly 
preemptive impact derives from the federal government’s action and those in which a 
federal failure to act is involved.  Relatively little attention has been paid to whether 
policymakers and judges should address preemption questions differently if the basis for 
preemption is federal inaction rather than action, even though preemption may have 
disparate policy implications in the two sets of situations. 
 
 This part explores the circumstances in which preemption of state law by federal 
inaction is appropriate.  It first provides criteria for determining as a normative matter 
whether Congress should explicitly preempt state regulation despite its decision not to 
create a federal regulatory presence in the area affected by state regulation.  It then 
analyzes how the courts have addressed and should address claims that state law has been 
preempted by federal inaction.  Finally, it illustrates the impact of the approach to 
preemption by inaction recommended here by applying that approach to determine 
whether efforts by the states to regulate activities that contribute to global climate change 
should be preempted. 
 
A. Express Preemption 
 
Preemption by inaction questions can arise in two different regulatory contexts.  
First, Congress must decide whether to preempt state law even though it is not willing to 
adopt federal laws controlling the activities subject to the state law in question.  Second, 
if Congress has included an express preemption provision in a federal statute, the courts 
must determine the scope of that provision if its applicability to a particular state 
regulatory program is not clear from the face of the provision.  For reasons discussed 
below, Congress should exercise its authority to preempt by inaction sparingly and the 
courts should interpret the scope of express preemption provisions narrowly when the 
basis for preemption is the federal government’s failure to act. 
 
1. The Limited Justifications for Preemption by Inaction 
 
 Congress may preempt state law in its entirety, assuming it is authorized under the 
enumerated powers set forth in Article I of the Constitution to intervene in the area that 
would otherwise be covered by state law.  The exercise of that power to preempt should 
be exercised carefully, however, in circumstances in which the federal government has 
not established its own presence in the relevant field of regulation. 
 
The reasons why it may be advisable for Congress to refrain from readily 
preempting state law despite federal inaction in the area covered by state law are 
illustrated by considering the impact of preemption on state pollution control laws.  States 
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may adopt these laws to address a perceived market failure, such as the failure of an 
unregulated market to force polluters to take into account the harmful impacts that their 
activities impose on others.52  A state also may enact pollution control laws to reduce 
levels of health or environmental risks that it considers to be unacceptably high. 
 
The Framers of the Constitution sought to preserve state sovereignty at the same 
time that they created a new national government.  The Supremacy Clause − the source of 
the preemption doctrine − undoubtedly allows appropriately adopted federal law to 
supplant state law.  In light of the importance the Framers attributed to the preservation of 
state sovereignty, however, Congress should exercise that authority sparingly and only 
after careful consideration of the impact of the resulting infringements on state 
sovereignty.  These considerations are particularly apt when the state law whose 
preemption is at issue falls within the realm of traditional state authority, such as the 
power to take actions to protect the public health and safety.53 
 
Further, Congress should be even more reluctant to preempt environmental laws 
by inaction than it is to adopt a federal regulatory regime that displaces state law.  If a 
state’s pollution control law is preempted despite the absence of any federal regulation of 
the same activities, polluters will remain free to emit levels of pollution that the state 
deems inappropriately high because those levels lead either to inefficient resource 
allocation, inadequate protection of public health and the environment, or both.  If state 
law is preempted as a result of the promulgation of a pollution control program by the 
federal government, the activities the state sought to regulate will at least be subject to 
some constraints other than those supplied by the market.54 
                                                 
52
 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 11-13 (5th ed. 
2007).  See also SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 53 (3d ed. 2003): 
 The price that consumers pay for a product in an efficient market reflects the full value of 
the resources that are used in the production of that product.  A market flaw exists when the 
producer of a product avoids paying for some of these production costs.  For example, if the owner 
of a factory that emits pollution does not pay the medical expenses of persons who become ill 
from the pollution, the price of the product will not reflect such medical costs.  The market will be 
inefficient because there will be more demand for the product than if the factory owner had paid 
for the damages caused by the pollution.  If the factory owner had made such payments, the price 
of the firm’s products would have been higher, and fewer products would have been sold. 
“One of the key goals of environmental law is thus to bring environmental externalities into the 
marketplace.”  JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 20-21 
(2d ed. 2007).  Other types of regulation seek to promote economic efficiency by addressing other kinds of 
market failure, such as the absence of competition, barriers to entry into a market, inadequate or inaccurate 
information for consumers, or inadequate provision of public goods.  Still other regulatory regimes pursue 
noneconomic goals, such as inequitable distribution of wealth or the pursuit of noneconomic collective 
values. 
53
 Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (characterizing the powers to regulate land use and protect 
the health and safety as “at the heart of the States’ traditional police power”). 
54
 The difference between preemption by action and inaction may a difference of degree rather than kind.  
If a federal program to control pollution is weak, the resulting level of pollution may still be less efficient 
or less protective than the state whose law is preempted desires.  Even if the federal is rigorous, a state may 
prefer an even more stringent program.  If it is precluded from imposing one, the resulting level of 
polluting activity will remain too high from the perspective of the state. 
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These concerns should not preclude federal preemption of state environmental, 
health, and safety regulation across the board.  Preemption by inaction is appropriate in 
two contexts.  First, Congress should preempt a state regulation if it concludes that the 
state’s approach to addressing a particular form of market failure (such as unaccounted 
for externalities) will adversely affect the interests of other states who are not capable of 
protecting themselves against the externalities created by the state regulatory regime 
whose fate is at issue.  This justification for preemption mirrors the rationale the Supreme 
Court has developed for interpreting the Commerce Clause of the Constitution as 
imposing constrains on state activity that discriminates against interstate commerce or 
results in extraterritorial regulation.55 
 
Second, it is appropriate for Congress to preempt state regulation, despite the 
absence of a federal regulatory program, if it concludes that federal interests are best 
served by confining legal constraints on the operation of the free market to those derived 
from traditional sources of law such as common law contract and property law rules.  
Congress might decide, for example, that the adoption of diverse state regulatory 
requirements threatens the development of a beneficial new technology and that, unless 
and until Congress decides to regulate the use of that technology, there should be no 
positive statutory or administrative regulation.56  It is quite another thing for Congress to 
displace a state’s regulatory efforts simply because it concludes that the state’s perception 
that market failure exists is mistaken or that the regulatory regime the state has adopted to 
address market failure will be ineffective.  The respect for state sovereignty reflected in 
our constitutional system of federalism supports allowing a state to regulate activities 
within the state’s borders even if its chosen method of regulation is ill-advised or 
unnecessary because of the state’s mistaken diagnosis of market failure. 
 
If Congress determines that one of the two circumstances that justify preemption 
despite the absence of federal regulation exists, it should include in the statutory 
preemption provisions it adopts an explicit justification for preemption.  The statute 
                                                 
55
 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  As the Court recently explained, “when a 
law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous scrutiny is appropriate because the law 
is often the product of ‘simple economic protectionism.’”  United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795-96 (2007) (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 
454 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27).  See also Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. 
Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1999) (striking down as an improper “clog on interstate commerce” a 
Wisconsin statute allowing out-of-state waste to be disposed of within Wisconsin only if the community 
where the waste originates adopts an ordinance incorporating the mandatory components of Wisconsin’s 
recycling program). 
56
 Cf. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005) (describing Congress’s decision in 
adopting the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to “encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies” by reducing “the impediments imposed by local governments upon the 
installation of facilities for wireless communications, such as antenna towers” and imposing “specific 
limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, 
and modification of such facilities”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983) (describing “Congress’ determination that the national interest would 
be best served if the Government encouraged the private sector to become involved in the development of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation and licensing”). 
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should enunciate either that state regulation would impose unjustified externalities on 
states other than the adopting state or that state regulation would interfere with federal 
objectives that can best be promoted by freezing the status quo, thereby blocking the 
adoption of constraints on the free market that are not reflected in existing sources of law 
such as rules of contract and property law.  In the first case, the statute should identify the 
externalities the preemption provision is designed to prevent.  In the second case, 
Congress should identify the federal interests it seeks to protect and the manner in which 
state regulation would frustrate those interests. 
 
2. The Need for Narrow Judicial Construction of Express Preemption 
Provisions 
 
The same respect for state sovereignty, especially in areas of traditional state 
concern, which supports limited invocation of Congress’s power to preempt in the face of 
federal inaction also supports narrow judicial construction of express statutory 
preemption provisions when the alleged preemption occurs in the context of inaction.  
Congress is fully capable of expressing clearly its desire to preempt state regulation even 
though the federal government has chosen not to act.  If an express preemption provision 
does not clearly cover situations in which the federal government has failed to act, the 
courts should presume that Congress did not intend to preempt through inaction. 
 
The Supreme Court has adopted precisely that approach in some cases in which 
federal statutes were alleged to preempt state law despite the federal government’s failure 
to regulate the activities covered by the state regime.  In Puerto Rico Department of 
Consumer Affairs v. ISA Petroleum Corp.,57 for example, several oil companies sued 
Puerto Rico claiming that its regulations imposing excise taxes on oil refiners were 
preempted by federal law.  In 1973, Congress adopted the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act,58 which authorized the President to issue regulations controlling the 
prices and allocation of crude oil and refined petroleum products.  A subsequent statute 
extended the President’s authority, but subjected it to a sunset provision.59  The oil 
companies claimed that the 1973 Act “evinced a federal intent to enter the field of 
petroleum allocation and price regulation, and that [the subsequent Act] never 
countermanded that intent, but merely changed the nature of the federally imposed 
regime from one of federal hands-on regulation to one of federally mandated free-market 
control.”60 
 
The Court disagreed with that characterization of the second of the two federal 
statutes, rejecting the refiners’ preemption challenge.  It concluded that, although the 
Constitution allows Congress to create the kind of regime described by the refiners, the 
courts should not allow Congress to create one “subtly.”61  It stated that “[w]ithout a text 
                                                 
57
 485 U.S. 495 (1988). 
58
 Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973). 
59
 Puerto Rico Dep’t, 485 U.S. at 498 (citing the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 
89 Stat. 871 (1975)). 
60
 Id. at 500. 
61
 Id. 
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that can . . . plausibly be interpreted as prescribing federal pre-emption it is impossible to 
find that a free market was mandated by federal law.”62  The snippets of legislative 
history the oil companies supplied to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve a free 
market in petroleum products failed to provide the “clear and manifest” evidence of 
intent necessary to support preemption.  The Court distinguished a case decided in 1983, 
in which it had stated that “[a] federal decision to forego regulation in a given area may 
imply an authoritative determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that 
event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate.”63  According to 
the Court in the Puerto Rico Department case, Congress enacted the statute at issue in the 
1983 case “to fill a regulatory gap, not to perpetuate one.”64  The Court therefore 
concluded that Congress’s withdrawal from substantial involvement in regulation of the 
petroleum industry did not amount to an “extant action” sufficient to create an inference 
of preemption “in an unregulated segment of an otherwise regulated field[;] preemption, 
if it is intended, must be explicitly stated.”65  Congress’s decision to repeal the 1973 Act 
“did not leave behind a pre-emptive grin without a statutory cat.”66 
 
The Puerto Rico Department case highlights the need for an explicit statement by 
Congress that it intends its failure to regulate or authorize regulation by a federal agency 
to preempt state regulation.  If anything, the inference that Congress intended to oust state 
regulatory authority is even weaker when the federal government has never regulated 
than where it has regulated and chosen to stop doing so.  In the latter situation, it is at 
least plausible that, after reviewing the effects of federal regulation, Congress decided 
that regulation was not having the intended beneficial effects and that the absence of 
regulation was preferable.  In any event, whether the federal government has regulated 
and chosen to cease doing so or has never regulated at all in the field chosen for state 
intervention, the courts should not find preemption unless Congress has clearly stated in 
the statute that states may not regulate despite the absence of federal regulatory activity. 
 
The Supreme Court has followed this approach in cases involving alleged 
preemption of common law remedies as well as positive regulatory enactments.67  In 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 501. 
63
 Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983). 
64
 Id. 
65
 Puerto Rico Dep’t, 485 U.S. at 504. 
66
 Id.  Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Puerto Rico Dep’t, was presumably referring to the 
Cheshire cat in Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 63-67 (Grosset & 
Dunlap 1946) (1865).  See generally Parker V. Potter, Wondering About Alice: Judicial References to Alice 
in Wonderland and Alice through the Looking Glass, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 175, 200-15 (2006). 
67
 The Supreme Court at one time applied the presumption against preemption with particular force when 
the body of law allegedly preempted was state common law.  In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238, 251 (1984), the Court found it “difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all 
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct” by preempting state common law remedies.  
That analysis reflected “two important assumptions about congressional purposes:  that Congress would not 
destroy traditional means of legal recourse without acknowledging it openly, and that, therefore, Congress 
presumably intends that [these means of] recourse remain.”  Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional 
Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 202 (2004).  More recently, the Court has “backed 
away” from the application of a presumption against federal preemption of state common law damage 
actions and adopted instead an approach “which incorporates an assessment of legislative purposes without 
the use of any presumptions, coupled with a default to federal law in the case of an actual conflict.”  Id. at 
To be published at 26 Virginia Environmental Law Journal ___ (2007) 
Glicksman Page 16 7/8/2007 
C:\Word\articles\inactionpreemption2007.ssrn.doc 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,68 for example, the surviving spouse of a woman who died 
when she fell out of a boat and was struck by the propeller of the boat’s outboard motor 
brought a tort action against the manufacturer of the outboard motor used on the boat.  
The manufacturer asserted that the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FSBA)69 preempted 
the tort action.  That statute authorizes the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the 
Coast Guard, to issue regulations establishing minimum safety standards for recreational 
vessels and associated equipment.70  The FBSA includes a preemption provision, which 
bars the states from establishing or enforcing “a law or regulation establishing a 
recreational vessel or associated equipment performance standard or imposing a 
requirement for associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation” issued by 
the Coast Guard under the FBSA.71  Although the Coast Guard issued regulations that 
included boat performance and safety standards, they did not include any propeller guard 
requirement.  After an advisory committee recommended that the Coast Guard require 
the adoption of propeller injury avoidance methods, the Coast Guard indicated that it 
would do so in subsequent regulations, but at the time of the accident, it had not yet done 
so.72  The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the manufacturer’s express preemption 
claim, concluding that the FBSA’s preemption provision does not apply to common law 
claims.73  It reasoned that it made sense for Congress not to preempt common-law claims, 
“which − unlike most administrative and legislative regulations − necessarily perform an 
important remedial role in compensating accident victims. Indeed, compensation is the 
manifest object of the [FBSA’s] saving clause, which focuses not on state authority to 
regulate, but on preserving ‘liability at common law or under State law.’”74 
 
3. Express Preemption by Inaction of State Climate Change 
Regulation 
 
Assuming the federal government continues to refrain from regulating activities 
that contribute to global climate change, what implications would the adoption of the 
standards for congressional and judicial preemption by inaction described in this section 
have for preemption of state regulation of those activities?  The standards would support 
                                                                                                                                                 
200.  See also id. at 202 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)); id. at 211 (noting 
that in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), the Court “never mentions the presumption 
against preemption,” suggesting that “the previous ‘default’ to state law that might have occurred under 
such a presumption is gone, and a ‘default’ to federal law inherent in the Supremacy Clause has taken its 
place”); Ausness, supra note 38, at 959 (pointing out that, instead of applying the presumption against 
preemption, the Court in Geier “relied heavily on elusive ‘ordinary pre-emption principles’ to interpret the 
statutory text”). 
68
 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
69
 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311. 
70
 Id. § 4302(a). 
71
 Id. § 4311. 
72
 Sprietsma,  537 U.S. at 61-62. 
73
 Id. at 63-64.  The express pre-emption clause applied to “a [state or local] law or regulation.”  46 U.S.C. 
§ 4306.  The Court determined that “the terms ‘law’ and ‘regulation’ used together in the pre-emption 
clause indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive enactments.  If ‘law’ were read broadly so as to 
include the common law, it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the 
express reference to ‘regulation’ in the pre-emption clause superfluous.”  Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63. 
74
 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 4611(g) and citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 
U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
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partial preemption of state laws regulating GHG emissions from motor vehicles, but 
would not support preemption of state regulation of stationary sources. 
 
a. Should Congress Preempt State Regulation of Activities 
that Contribute to Climate Change? 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that Congress should preempt state regulation 
despite federal inaction only if state regulation would adversely affect the interests of 
other states unable to protect themselves or federal interests are best served in the absence 
of positive regulation.  One state’s regulation of GHGs would not impose any 
environmental externalities on other states.  If a regulated source, mobile or stationary, 
complies with the state’s controls, adverse impacts on the environment will be reduced, 
not increased.  Even if a stationary source subject to state A’s constraints on GHG 
emissions decides to locate elsewhere to avoid state A’s regulation, other states will not 
suffer additional adverse GHG-related environmental effects because the emission of 
GHGs will have the same adverse impacts on the environment regardless of where they 
take place.75  Thus, the degree to which a source subject to state A’s regulation 
contributes to global climate change that adversely affects state B will be the same 
regardless of whether the source continued to operate in state A free of regulation, moves 
to state C to avoid regulation, or even locates in state B.76 
 
State regulation also has the potential to impose economic externalities on other 
states.77  If, for example, state A restricts motor vehicle emissions of GHGs and the auto 
manufacturers decide to continue to market their products in those states, the economic 
interests of other states could be affected.  Compliance with state A’s regulation is likely 
to increase the auto manufacturers’ production costs.  Professor Daniel Esty described the 
problem as follows: 
 
Many pollution-control or resource-use decisions have economic impacts that cannot be 
dismissed simply as a function of welfare-enhancing resource reallocation.  California's 
adoption of auto emissions standards that exceed national requirements may reflect the 
fact that Californians stand to benefit greatly from lower emissions and to pay relatively 
little of the extra pollution control costs that will be borne largely by out-of-state 
                                                 
75
 “[G]reenhouse gas emissions do not impact locally, but globally:  no matter where the gases are emitted, 
they contribute to global warming at any place on Earth.”  Isabel Rauch, Developing a German and an 
International Emissions Trading System − Lessons from U.S. Experiences with the Acid Rain Program, 11 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 307, 431 (2000).  See also Karl S. Coplan, The Intercivilizational Inequities of 
Nuclear Power Weighed Against the Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy, 17 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 231 (2006) (stating that “[g]reenhouse gas impacts are global, not local or regional”). 
76
 If the stationary source locates in state B, it might adversely affect state B’s environment in other ways, 
such as by contributing to air pollution that is localized in nature or to water pollution.  Those effects may 
justify preemption under federal regulatory programs that address those types of pollution, but preemption 
would not be justified on the basis of the impact in state B of state A’s regulation of GHG emissions. 
77
 “An [economic] externality may be viewed as either an economic gain or loss accruing to one or more 
‘recipient’ agents as the result of an economic action ‘initiated’ by another agent − with the gain or loss not 
being reflected in price.”  Jesse Ratcliffe, Comment, Reenvisioning the Risk Bubble: Utilizing a System of 
Intra-Firm Risk Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1779, 1789 n.51 (2004) (quoting 
BERNARD P. HERBER, MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 36 (3d ed. 1975)). 
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automakers.  In this case, there is no market mechanism to ensure that California's action 
is nationally welfare-enhancing.  Californians may pay part of the bill for their more 
stringent pollution controls through higher prices for cars, but consumers elsewhere may 
also be forced to pay increased prices, essentially subsidizing California's reduced-
pollution benefits.  In particular, we have no guarantee that the benefits to California 
outweigh the sum of the costs imposed both inside and outside of California.78 
 
Thus, a state like Michigan may suffer as a result of state A’s regulation if the 
manufacturers experience reduced profits, and therefore reduced state tax liability.  If the 
manufacturers decide to market the same cars nationwide and to build them all to comply 
with state A’s regulations, the costs of purchasing cars is likely to increase in all states.  
The creation of these adverse external economic consequences provides a stronger 
justification for preempting state A’s regulation than the non-existent adverse 
environmental externalities that flow from state A’s regulation.79  As the discussion 
immediately below of the other policy ground for preemption despite federal inaction 
indicates, however, even this ground justifies only partial preemption of state regulation 
of motor vehicle emissions of GHGs. 
 
The second ground for express preemption of state regulation in the face of 
federal inaction is the potential for state regulation to thwart federal goals such as 
uniformity and minimization of transaction costs.  Section 209(a) of the CAA limits the 
degree to which the states may regulate motor vehicle emissions.80  The justification for 
preempting state regulation has always been that multifarious state regulatory regimes 
would create havoc for the auto manufacturers, whose transaction costs would increase 
significantly if they were forced to manufacture cars with different kinds of emission 
controls to meet the requirements of each state in which they do business.  A 1965 Senate 
committee report explained that “it would be more desirable to have national standards 
rather than for each State to have a variation in standards and requirements which could 
                                                 
78
 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 594 (1996).  Professor 
Esty asserts that “[f]rom a utility-maximizing perspective, parties suffering from economic or 
psychological spillovers also should have their interests factored into the regulatory calculus.”  Id. at 593.  
Early federal air pollution legislation reflected the desire to prevent a state’s environmental controls from 
imposing economic externalities elsewhere.  A House committee report recognized that one way for the 
auto manufacturers to meet diverse state tailpipe emission standards would be to manufacture vehicles that 
comply with the most stringent controls, federal or state.  It found this solution objectionable, however: 
While manufacturers could meet [the] problems [stemming from separately issued and 
administered standards] by building vehicles that meet whichever standard is the more stringent, 
this would lead to increased costs to consumers nationwide, with benefit only to those in one 
section of the country. 
Air Quality Act of 1967, H.R. REP. NO. 90-728 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1958. 
79
 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 155, 181 (2003) (quoting Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 45, 45 (1997)) (“[E]conomic federalism prefers the most decentralized structure of government 
capable of internalizing all economic externalities. . . .”); Darin Michael Lowder, Strange Watershed 
Bedfellows? Will the EPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy Encourage Unlikely Clean Water Alliances?, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 411, 422 (2005) (“Some argue that regulations should be centralized because local 
regulation fails to account for economic externalities . . . .”) 
80
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
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result in chaos insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users are concerned.”81  The 
committee supported prohibiting the states from adopting their own controls on emissions 
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines on the ground that “a provision 
such as this is necessary in order to prevent a chaotic situation from developing in 
interstate commerce in new motor vehicles.”82  Exclusive federal regulation of tailpipe 
emissions ensures that the auto companies will have to deal with only one standard. 
 
This desire for uniformity and reduced transaction costs obviously has some 
bearing on the desirability of allowing the states to regulate GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles.  Congress has already determined, however, that a complete prohibition on state 
tailpipe emissions standards is unwarranted.  Section 209(b) of the CAA authorizes EPA 
to waive the statutory prohibition on state regulation for California.83  Further, the CAA 
allows other states to adopt standards identical to those adopted by California and 
approved by EPA.84  Allowing California to adopt GHG emission controls and allowing 
other states to piggyback onto the California standards would seem to pose no greater 
obstacles to the federal interest in uniformity and minimal transaction costs than the 
current CAA does for the air pollutants already being regulated by EPA, even if Congress 
or EPA eventually adopts motor vehicle emission controls for GHGs.  The justification 
for preempting state regulation of GHG emissions from factories and other stationary 
sources is even weaker, because such sources and the pollution controls they use tend to 
be designed on a site-specific basis.85  The transaction cost problem upon which federal 
preemption of motor vehicle emissions is based therefore exists only to a very limited 
degree, if at all. 
 
b. Has Congress Expressly Preempted State Regulation of 
Activities that Contribute to Climate Change? 
 
The CAA does not currently include provisions that specifically identify the 
degree to which state regulation of GHGs is allowed.  The statute does have more general 
preemption provisions.  One provision bars state regulation that is less stringent than 
standards adopted by EPA.86  This provision has no bearing on state regulation of GHGs 
because EPA has not adopted any standards restricting GHG emissions.  Another 
provision is the one that bars state regulation of motor vehicle emissions, but allows EPA 
to exempt California from that prohibition.87  Narrow construction of that provision 
might support the conclusion that the prohibition only applies when EPA has adopted 
                                                 
81
 S. REP. NO. 89-192, at 6 (1965). 
82
 Id. at 8. 
83
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
84
 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (providing that, notwithstanding the preemptive provisions of § 209(a), states 
containing EPA-approved plans for controlling pollution in nonattainment areas may adopt and enforce 
standards controlling emissions from new motor vehicles if they are identical to California’s standards for 
which EPA has granted a waiver). 
85
 See, e.g., Regan J.R. Smith, Playing the Acid Rain Game: A State’s Remedies, 16 ENVTL. L. 255, 315 
(1986) (explaining that “nitrogen oxide reductions are dependent on very site specific factors, such as types 
of fuel, type of burner, and type of plant”). 
86
 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
87
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)-(b). 
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motor vehicle emission controls for the particular air pollutant involved.  Because it has 
not done so for GHGs, the states are free to regulate them.  At a minimum, the provision 
allows California to seek EPA’s approval to regulate GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles.88  If EPA approves of California’s request, other states can adopt controls 
identical to California’s EPA-approved standards.89 
 
 B. Implied Preemption 
 
 Assuming that Congress has not adopted any express preemption provision or that 
any such provision does not cover the activities subject to state regulation, the next 
question is whether federal inaction nevertheless implicitly preempts state law.  This 
section argues that even if the Supreme Court does not jettison the implied preemption 
doctrine entirely or significantly narrow the scope of its application, as some have urged, 
implied preemption based on occupation of the field is never appropriate in the face of 
federal inaction.  The courts should refuse to preempt in the face of inaction based on an 
alleged conflict between federal and state law unless Congress has explicitly delegated to 
a federal agency the authority to preempt state law and the agency has appropriately 
exercised that authority. 
 
  1. Should Courts Ever Recognize Implied Preemption? 
 
 Although it is well established that federal law may preempt state law implicitly 
even if it does not do so explicitly,90 it is not so clear when implicit preemption may be 
triggered by federal inaction.  It is obvious that the complete absence of any federal 
activity can never provide a basis for preempting state law.  The Supremacy Clause 
provides that the Constitution “and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” anything in state law to the 
contrary notwithstanding.91  In the absence of any federal “Law,” the Supremacy Clause 
simply does not apply and preemption is therefore impossible.  As the Supreme Court 
recognized in the Puerto Rico Department case, “[t]here is no federal pre-emption in 
vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute to assert it.”92  Thus, if Congress 
considers but decides not to adopt legislation that would authorize federal regulation of 
particular activities, the legislature’s refusal to adopt the legislation has no preemptive 
effect.  Federal law becomes effective only if it is passed by both Houses of Congress and 
is signed by the President.93 The failure to enact regulatory legislation does not satisfy 
                                                 
88
 EPA may issue a waiver only if it determines “that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least 
as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.”  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).  EPA 
may not issue a waiver if it finds that the state’s action is arbitrary and capricious, the state does not need 
its own standards “to meet extraordinary and compelling conditions,” or the state’s adoption and 
enforcement procedures are not consistent with the statutory provisions authorizing EPA to control motor 
vehicle emissions.  Id. 
89
 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
90
 Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledges that state law may be preempted even when the allegedly 
preemptive federal statute includes an express preemption provision that does not apply to the activities 
subject to state regulation.  See supra note 51. 
91
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2-3. 
92
 Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. ISA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988). 
93
 The bicameralism and presentment requirements derive from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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either the bicameralism or presentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution, and 
therefore has no effect whatsoever, including preemptive effect on state law.94 
 
The harder cases involve situations in which Congress has adopted legislation that 
does not cover the activities subject to state regulation, or Congress has authorized a 
federal agency to regulate the activities subject to state regulation but the agency has 
chosen not to do so.  Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should abolish 
the implied preemption doctrine entirely (except in situations in which compliance with 
both federal and state law is impossible),95 constrain the application of implied 
preemption principles,96 or strengthen the presumption against preemption.97  Each of 
these approaches makes a finding of implied preemption by federal inaction unlikely. 
 
One justification for doing so is that Congress is fully capable of including in a 
statute an explicit declaration of preemption and defining the scope of the preempted 
field.  If Congress fails to adopt an express preemption provision, the respect for state 
sovereignty reflected in the federalism structure of the Constitution supports judicial 
refusal to oust state law implicitly.  Further, if the courts refuse to recognize implicit 
preemption, Congress will have strong incentives to consider whether preemption is 
appropriate and, if so, state the rationale for and the scope of the preemption it desires on 
the face of the statute.  Although this approach represents a significant departure from 
established Supreme Court preemption doctrine, those who support it tend to claim that it 
is desirable as a means of encouraging Congress to make the difficult policy choices 
associated with preemption instead of foisting them upon the courts.98  Some state courts 
                                                 
94
 Cf. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that legislative veto 
violated the bicameralism and presentment requirements). 
95
 Cf. Betsy J. Gray, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. 
REV.559, 621-22 (1997) (arguing that “when a federal statute either has no preemption clause or has a 
clause that does not explicitly refer to state tort claims, courts should rarely find implied preemption of tort 
claims, under either the ‘occupation of the field’ or ‘direct conflict’ rubric,”  but that, “in the absence of 
language expressly preempting state tort claims, a court may still be justified in finding implied preemption 
when compliance with both the state tort duty and the federal statute would be impossible”). 
96
 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 11, at 232 (asserting that “a general doctrine of obstacle preemption is 
misplaced”); id. at 304 (supporting preemption framework under which, “[i]n the realm of ‘obstacle’ 
preemption, for instance, courts could no longer find preemption simply because they think that state law 
hinders accomplishment of the ‘full purposes and objectives’ behind a federal statute; courts would first 
have to determine that the federal statute expresses or implies a rule of obstacle preemption broad enough 
to cover the state law (and that this rule is within Congress’s constitutional powers to establish”)). 
97
 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 469 
(1980) (“In the system of American public law, the basic assumption is that states have authority to 
regulate their own citizens and territory. This assumption justifies an interpretive principle requiring a clear 
statement before judges will find federal preemption of state law.”); Hills, supra note 17 (supporting a clear 
statement rule presumption against preemption on the ground that it will enhance the democratic 
accountability of Congress); Larry J. Obhof, Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of 
Federalism Principles Through Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123. 
98
 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 511-12 (2002) 
(stating that “clear statement” rule in the context of implied preemption “operates to ensure that the federal 
political process has focused upon the displacement of state authority before it acts to do so. Without such a 
rule there is no assurance that in fact Congress has attended to the consequences of displacing state 
authority.”). 
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have already abolished implied preemption, at least in certain areas such as the authority 
to tax.99 
 
Whether or not the abolition or significant restriction of implied preemption is 
appropriate as a general matter, the argument in favor of eliminating or confining implied 
preemption in cases that do not involve physical impossibility is perhaps at its strongest 
when the federal government has not intervened in the area affected by state regulation.  
The same considerations that support limited invocation of Congress’s authority to 
preempt explicitly in the face of inaction are relevant when litigants ask courts to find 
that state regulation is implicitly preempted despite the absence of federal action.  A court 
should not lightly assume that Congress wanted to preempt to avoid the adverse spillover 
effects of state regulation or to prevent interference with federal goals such as uniformity 
because Congress is fully capable of making such intent explicit.  In addition, preemption 
in the face of federal inaction leaves the state whose law is preempted at the mercy of the 
market failure that prompted it to regulate in the first place because no substitute federal 
regulatory regime exists.  Courts should be reluctant to conclude that Congress chose to 
divest the states of their traditional authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens without providing some assurance that it was taking alternative steps to 
address the states’ concerns.100 
 
2. Occupation of the Field Preemption 
 
 One of the two bases for a court’s conclusion that a state regulatory law is 
implicitly preempted is the conclusion that Congress has occupied the entire field in 
which the state seeks to regulate, leaving no room for supplemental state regulation of 
any kind.  In the context of federal preemption by inaction, the question is whether a 
failure to regulate should ever be regarded as tantamount to occupation of the field and, if 
so, under what circumstances.  The Supreme Court has not precluded occupation of the 
field based on federal inaction, although that result seems appropriate.  Its decisions 
indicate, however, that occupation by inaction rarely occurs, and that neither a desire for 
uniformity nor the presence of a purportedly comprehensive regulatory program should 
be regarded as sufficient grounds for preempting a state’s authority to regulate activities 
that are not subject to federal regulation. 
 
 a. Occupation of the Field Preemption by Inaction 
                                                 
99
 See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St. 3d 599, 693 N.E. 2d 212 (1998). 
100
 See, e.g., H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1939) (concluding that, “[i]n view of 
the efforts of governmental authorities everywhere to mitigate the destruction of life, limb and property 
resulting from the use of motor vehicles, it cannot be inferred that Congress intended to supersede any state 
safety measure prior to the taking effect of a federal measure found suitable to put in its place.  Its purpose 
to displace the local law must be definitely expressed.”).  Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (raising the possibility that the due process clause “requires that a 
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a 
reasonable substitute remedy,” but finding it unnecessary to decide whether it does because the federal 
statute in question did so).  Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for 
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 179-82 (1985) (arguing that courts should avoid interpreting federal 
statutes as preempting state common law damage actions in the absence of a comparable statutory 
substitute). 
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 Suppose that Congress has adopted legislation that addresses some aspects of a 
particular form of market failure but not others.  A state regulates in one of the areas not 
explicitly addressed by the federal statute.  In such cases, courts should never find 
implied preemption based on occupation of the field subject to state regulation.  If 
Congress wants to preempt an aspect of the field that it decides not to address in its larger 
regulatory program it is easy enough for it to say so in the statute.  If it does not, respect 
for state sovereignty and preservation of the states’ ability to protect their citizens from 
market failures that threaten the public health, safety, or welfare dictate that the state 
regulatory regime survive.  Even if Congress did not regulate the activities that the state 
has now chosen to address because it did not anticipate the problem when it initially 
adopted the statute, Congress has the authority to amend the statute to preempt state law 
explicitly on the basis of its capacity to foist problems on other states or interfere with 
federal goals such as uniformity.  Unless and until Congress exercises that power, the 
state regulatory program should survive. 
 
 Although the Supreme Court has not enunciated an absolute prohibition on 
implied occupation of the field preemption based on federal inaction, it has been reluctant 
to preempt in that context.  The Sprietsma case discussed above is illustrative.  After 
rejecting the boat manufacturer’s claim that the FBSA explicitly preempted state 
common law tort actions for damages arising from accidents involving propellers, the 
Court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s tort claim might nonetheless be implicitly 
preempted.101  It held, however, that the statute clearly did not occupy the field of 
recreational boat safety so as to foreclose state common law remedies.  The Act neither 
required that the Coast Guard adopt “comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of 
recreational boat safety and design,” nor reflected “a clear and manifest intent to sweep 
away state common law.”102  The manufacturer asserted that state common law damage 
awards would thwart the uniformity in regulation sought by Congress, but the Court 
found that the federal government’s interest in uniformity was “not unyielding,” as 
reflected in the Coast Guard’s previous decisions to exempt some state regulations from 
the explicit statutory preemption provision.103 
 
 Other federal and state courts also have rejected a purported congressional desire 
for uniform federal regulation as a sufficient basis for finding implied preemption based 
on occupation of the field in cases of federal inaction.  As one state court put it, a 
“generic concern for uniformity” should be regarded as inadequate to displace state 
law.104  According to the Supreme Court, there must, instead, be evidence that “Congress 
intended to centralize all decisionmaking authority in one decisionmaker:  the Federal 
Government.”105  On the other hand, affirmative evidence of Congress’s disavowal of a 
                                                 
101
 The Court indicated that the presence of an express preemption provision “does not bar the ordinary 
working of conflict pre-emption principles.”  Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) 
(quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)). 
102
 Id. at 69. 
103
 Id. at 70. 
104
 Kohn v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R., 77 P.3d 809, 813 (Colo. App. 2003). 
105
 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995). 
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desire for national uniformity should defeat an argument of field preemption by federal 
inaction.106 
 
 Nor should the apparently comprehensive nature of the regulations adopted by a 
federal agency under a regulatory statute provide the basis for the conclusion that the 
federal program occupies the field, thereby preempting state regulation of activities left 
unregulated by the agency.  The Supreme Court has indicated that the “pervasive nature” 
of a federal regulatory statute may “make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.”107  If the federal government has not regulated at 
all, of course, it is difficult to characterize its regulatory presence as “pervasive” in any 
normal sense of that term.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has explained that the traditional 
presumption against preemption is inapplicable when a state “regulates in an area where 
there has been a history of significant federal presence.”108  Inaction by definition will 
normally preclude a finding of such a significant presence. 
 
In addition, the Court has cautioned that courts should be wary of relying on the 
comprehensiveness of a federal regulatory program to find occupation of the field so as to 
preclude state regulation of activities falling within federal regulatory lacunae. 
 
To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is 
virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, 
its regulations will be exclusive.  Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent with the 
federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. 
 
. . . Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption, we will 
pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that 
the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt.  Given the presumption that state and local 
regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal 
regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal 
regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.109 
 
Preemption by occupation of the field tends to be rare.110  It should be rarer still if 
the basis for preempting state regulation is the federal government’s failure to regulate.  
 
b. Has Congress Preempted State Regulation of Activities that 
Contribute to Climate Change by Occupation of the Field? 
                                                 
106
 See, e.g., Toy Mfrs., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 1993).  Even in the absence of such 
evidence, Sprietsma indicates that the issuance of exemptions from any express statutory preemption 
provision by an agency explicitly authorized by statute to create such exemptions strengthens the argument 
that a regulatory field has not been exclusively occupied by the federal government to the exclusion of the 
states.  Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70. 
107
 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
108
 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
109
 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985). 
110
 See Mark C. Levy & Gregory C. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts to Reform Product Liability at the 
Food and Drug Administration: FDA’s Influence on Federal Preemption of Class III Medical Devices and 
Pharmaceuticals, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 495, 497 (2005) (“Preemption through occupation of a field is 
rare.”) 
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 Whether one applies an approach that prohibits all types of implied preemption 
other than when compliance with both federal and state regulation is physically 
impossible or one that reflects a disinclination to recognize implied occupation of the 
field by inaction, state regulation of GHG emissions by motor vehicles should not be 
preempted on the ground that the CAA has implicitly occupied the field of regulation of 
GHG emissions.111  Nothing in the CAA supplies evidence of “a clear and manifest intent 
to sweep away” state regulation of GHG emissions.112  Even in the context in which the 
benefits of uniform regulation are strongest − regulation of motor vehicle emissions − the 
CAA contains a concrete manifestation of Congress’s willingness to allow at least one set 
of state standards that depart from EPA’s.113  Finally, it would be ludicrous to describe 
federal regulation of either air pollution in general or GHG emissions in particular as 
comprehensive in light of the glacial pace at which the federal government has been 
willing to address global climate change. 
 
3. Conflict Preemption 
 
 Even if Congress has not occupied a particular field of activity to the complete 
exclusion of state regulation, state law may be preempted based on a conflict between 
federal and state law.  Conflicts exist if either it is physically impossible to comply with 
both federal and state law or compliance with state law would frustrate federal statutory 
objectives.  Preemption by physical impossibility makes no sense if the alleged basis for 
preemption is federal inaction.  Preemption based on conflict of purpose is more 
appropriate in the face of federal inaction, but should nevertheless be rare. 
 
Finally, the approach courts take in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of the 
preemptive effects of a federal statute that the agency is responsible for administering 
ought to be affected by the fact that the argument for preemption arises from federal 
inaction.  If the agency has failed to exercise any authority it has to regulate the activities 
subject to state regulation, its conclusion that the statute was intended to preempt state 
law should be afforded no deference unless Congress has explicitly delegated to the 
agency the authority to make preemptive judgments. 
 
   a. Conflict Preemption by Inaction 
 
 Of the two types of conflict preemption, the analysis of whether federal inaction 
should be able to preempt state law due to physical impossibility presents a fairly 
straightforward question.  The inquiry into the appropriate circumstances in which federal 
inaction may frustrate federal statutory purposes is more complex. 
 
    (1) Physical Impossibility 
                                                 
111
 The outcome of occupation of the field preemption cases often turns on how the court decides to define 
the scope of the allegedly occupied field.  It is obvious that Congress did not intend for the CAA to occupy 
the broader field of regulation of air pollution.  See, e.g.¸ 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7416. 
112
 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69. 
113
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)(1). 
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 Conflict preemption based on the impossibility of complying with both federal 
and state law is unusual in the field of environmental regulation.  Emission controls that 
take the form of performance standards should not pose impossibility problems because 
they dictate the level of pollution allowed, but not the manner of achieving it.  If both the 
federal and state governments have adopted emissions controls applicable to the same 
industry and neither one mandates a particular method of compliance, regulated entities 
can comply with both sets of standards by achieving the more stringent of the two 
standards.  Emissions controls that take the form of design standards are more 
problematic.  If federal and state standards applicable to the same activities both mandate 
the method of compliance but do so in different ways, it may be impossible to comply 
with both.114  Because performance standards predominate under the federal pollution 
control statutes,115 instances of conflict due to physical impossibility should be rare. 
 
Even if a state standard takes the form of a design standard, the absence of any 
federal standard applicable to the activities subject to state regulation would undercut any 
claim that compliance with both federal and state law is impossible.  If state law requires 
installation of technology “x” and federal law requires nothing at all, it is not physically 
impossible to comply with the laws of both jurisdictions.  It is clearly not physically 
impossible, for example, for a car manufacturer subject to state controls on GHG 
emissions to comply with both federal and state law because there is no federal law with 
which to comply.  If state regulation restricts GHG emissions, compliance with that 
constraint will not violate federal law; the absence of federal restrictions does not 
preclude a manufacturer from installing emission control equipment either voluntarily or 
in order to be able to comply with state emission standards. 
 
    (2) Frustration of Federal Purposes 
 
 The analysis of whether state regulation frustrates federal objectives in the event 
that the federal government has not addressed the activities subject to state regulation is 
more complicated.  The mere fact that there is no federal regulation, however, is not 
enough to support a finding that state regulation would interfere with the accomplishment 
of federal statutory purposes. 
 
                                                 
114
 The difference between performance and design standards has been described as follows: 
Both types of standards typically specify a goal that the agency defines by ascertaining the level of 
pollution abatement that is technologically and economically possible for regulated entities to 
achieve.  The difference is that under a design standard the agency defines the method by which 
regulated entities are required to achieve the goal − such as by installing and operating a particular 
kind of pollution control technology or work practice − whereas under a performance standard, 
regulated entities are free to achieve the goal any way they want.  They can use the model 
technology or work practice identified by the agency as the one that makes compliance possible, 
or they can devise alternative means of meeting the goal. 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, Instruments, and Environmental Policy Choice, 10 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 297, 305 (2000). 
115
 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 76 (“Despite often being derided as inefficient ‘command and 
control’ regulation, technology-based standards typically do not mandate the use of any particular 
technology, but instead require achieving the performance level of the benchmark group.”). 
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(a) Frustration in the Context of Federal 
Inaction 
 
 A decision by Congress or a federal administrative agency not to regulate 
particular activities is not sufficient to demonstrate that state regulation of those activities 
would frustrate federal goals, as Supreme Court preemption decisions recognize. In 
Sprietsma, the outboard motor manufacturer claimed that the plaintiff’s tort claims were 
implicitly preempted by the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards.  The 
Court held to the contrary, insisting that “[i]t is quite wrong to view that decision as the 
functional equivalent of a regulation prohibiting all States and their political subdivisions 
from adopting such a regulation.”116  Instead, the agency’s decision not to regulate only 
maintained the status quo of no federal regulation.  According to the Court, “history 
teaches us that a Coast Guard decision not to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety 
is fully consistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority pending the 
adoption of specific federal standards.”117 
 
The Sprietsma decision recognizes that the absence of federal regulation is not 
necessarily indicative of a judgment by the federal government that federal policies are 
best promoted by exempting the activities the state seeks to regulate from positive 
regulation by all levels of government.  There are other possible explanations for the 
absence of federal regulation.  Congress or a federal agency may have decided not to 
regulate, for example, because they do not feel comfortable regulating yet based on the 
available information.  A decision not to regulate may have been based on the perception 
that a problem that has been identified is not common enough or important enough to 
warrant the commitment of federal regulatory resources.  Neither of these reasons is 
tantamount to a conclusion that federal purposes would be thwarted if state regulation 
proceeds in the absence of federal regulation.  If a state takes a more precautionary 
approach to a health and environmental risk than the federal government has done, and is 
willing to regulate on the basis of less information than the federal government deems 
necessary to support its own regulatory initiatives, federal purposes are not thwarted if 
state regulation proceeds.  If a problem that is not widespread is nevertheless 
concentrated in a state that desires to regulate its causes, there is no reason to anticipate 
that state regulation will frustrate federal purposes.  If the only reason that federal and 
state policymakers reach a different decision on the desirability of regulation is that the 
two levels of government assess comparative risks differently − the state places a higher 
priority than the federal government does in addressing a particular form of market 
failure, as compared to alternative uses of government resources − conflict preemption is 
not justified on the ground that state regulation would interfere with the achievement of 
federal objectives.  Thus, preemption due to conflict is appropriate only if the federal 
government “affirmatively decides that no regulation is needed.”118 
 
(b) The Relevance of the Agency’s Position on 
Preemption by Inaction 
                                                 
116
 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002). 
117
 Id. 
118
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 186 F.3d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Assuming that purpose-based conflict preemption should rest on more than just 
the absence of federal regulation of the activities that the state has decided to regulate, 
does it make any difference who decided not to act?  Should the preemption analysis 
differ depending on whether Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to act but 
the agency has chosen not to do so or Congress has chosen not to even delegate to the 
agency the authority to regulate? 
 
Even though Part III A.1 above argues as a normative matter that Congress should 
preempt state regulation despite federal inaction in limited circumstances, if Congress 
does decide to preempt, and makes that intent explicit,119 the courts should abide by that 
determination.120  By definition, however, if the form of preemption at issue is implied 
preemption based on a conflict between state regulation and federal policies, Congress 
has failed to enunciate whether it wants the federal government’s unwillingness or 
inability to act to preclude a particular state regulation.  It is not unusual for federal 
agencies to take a position on whether state regulation would interfere with the 
achievement of federal statutory goals.121  The courts should defer to such an assessment 
only in limited situations. 
 
In particular, a court should not preempt state law based on frustration of federal 
statutory objectives unless Congress has explicitly delegated to the federal agency that 
has found state regulation to be inconsistent with federal purposes the authority to 
preempt a state law that is not explicitly ousted by statute.122  A broad, general delegation 
of authority to an agency to implement the federal law should not suffice.  The 
preemption doctrine has the potential to alter radically the balance of state and federal 
power.  Moreover, a federal agency may have an incentive to declare state law preempted 
because doing so vests in it exclusive authority to regulate in the affected area, thereby 
enhancing its own power or insuring that it can promote the interests of favored 
constituencies.123  If Congress wants to turn over the power to affect the federal-state 
                                                 
119
 For an example of a provision that delegates to an agency the authority to preempt, see 47 U.S.C. § 
253(d) (authorizing the Federal Communications Commission the authority to make preemption 
determinations). 
120
 They ought not to do so, however, if they conclude that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to 
render judgment on the advisability of regulation. 
121
 See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006); National highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 49,223, 49,245 (Aug. 23, 2005) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Office of Comptroller of the 
Currency, Notice: Preemption Determination, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,271 (Aug. 5, 2003). 
122
 Cf. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 346 F.3d 851, 866 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997)) (stating that an agency’s interpretation 
of the preemptive effect of its own regulations is entitled to deference only if, among other things, 
“Congress has delegated authority to the agency”). 
123
 Professor Nina Mendelson described the problem as follows: 
. . . While an agency would not directly expand its own jurisdiction in reading an ambiguous 
statute to preempt state law, it could, through a preemption decision, indirectly lay the groundwork 
for an increase in the agency’s importance by making itself the primary regulator − as a practical 
matter, the only game in town.  This would enable it to demand a larger budget and more 
employees in order to properly regulate the field.  Alternatively, to the extent one accepts a public 
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balance in that fashion to a federal agency through the latter’s determinations to preempt 
state law, it should therefore say so explicitly.  In the absence of such an explicit 
delegation, the courts should refuse to interpret a general delegation of authority to 
implement the federal law as encompassing the power to declare state law ousted on the 
basis of the agency’s perception of the presence of a conflict between state law and 
federal objectives. 
 
This approach to ascertaining the impact of an agency’s declaration that state law 
must be preempted to prevent interference with federal policies is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s resolution of a different but related issue involving an agency’s ability 
to affect the balance of federal and state regulatory authority.  In Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,124 the issue before the 
Supreme Court was how much weight to accord to EPA’s and the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ interpretation of their own authority under the federal Clean Water Act 
(CWA) to require dredge and fill permits for the development of isolated intrastate 
waters.  The Court refused to defer to the expansive interpretation of the scope of the 
CWA’s permit program adopted by the two agencies because of the adverse implications 
such an interpretation would have on the maintenance of a proper balance between 
federal and state power.  The Court stated: 
 
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ 
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.  This requirement 
stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our 
assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret 
a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.  This concern is heightened where 
the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
encroachment upon a traditional state power.  See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
349 (1971) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to 
have significantly changed the federal-state balance.”).125 
 
Finding that the agencies’ interpretation would result in “a significant impingement of the 
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use,” the Court concluded that 
it was obliged to “read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and 
federalism questions raised by [the agencies’] interpretation,” and therefore reject the 
agency’s request that it defer to its broad reading of its statutory permitting authority.126  
Similarly, in a later case involving the same statutory provision, a plurality of the Court 
refused to defer to the same agencies’ interpretation of the scope of the permit program in 
                                                                                                                                                 
choice view of agency regulation, an agency’s power to preempt conflicting state law would make 
it better able to deliver on ‘deals’ with well-organized interest groups.  For one example, 
journalists suggested that an OSHA chief in the Reagan administration might be responding to 
industry by arguing for the preemption of state law by ‘weaker Federal labeling regulation.’  
Either self- interest or interest-group capture could conceivably lead an agency to discount state 
interests in rendering preemption decisions. 
Mendelson, supra note 15, at 794-95. 
124
 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
125
 Id. at 172-73. 
126
 Id. at 174. 
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another context because it did not qualify as a “’clear and manifest’ statement from 
Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority.” 127 
 
The question of whether the courts should defer to an agency’s statutory 
interpretation that stretches the limit of the federal government’s exercise of an 
enumerated power is a somewhat different question than the question of whether 
Congress intended, in an area within the scope of an enumerated power, to allow federal 
agencies to oust state regulatory power.  Both questions, however, have the potential to 
adversely affect the exercise of state regulatory authority.  Particularly if the affected 
activities are within the scope of the traditional state police power,128 the courts ought to 
be just as reluctant to defer to a federal agency’s interpretation that federal inaction ousts 
state power as the Supreme Court indicated they should be in interpreting statutes in a 
way that pushes the agency’s authority to the outer limits of an enumerated federal power 
such as the Commerce Clause.  Both kinds of interpretation can impinge on state power.  
The Court has acknowledged that “conflict pre-emption analysis must be applied 
sensitively . . . , so as to prevent the diminution of the role Congress reserved to the States 
while at the same time preserving the federal role.”129    
 
Moreover, the state interests might not be protected to the same extent if agencies 
rather than Congress make the decision on whether to preempt state law.  The states are 
represented in Congress. They can block legislation adverse to their interests (including 
legislation that would preempt state regulatory authority), for example, by mustering 51 
votes in the Senate against the legislation.130  The states have no similar mechanism for 
protecting their interests if agencies make the decision on whether to preempt.  Agencies 
promulgating regulations are usually required to provide public notice and solicit 
comments,131 but the views of the states are not necessarily afforded any greater weight 
by the agency than those of any other affected interest.  Judicial deference to agency 
determinations of a statute’s preemptive effect therefore runs the risk of reducing the 
                                                 
127
 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 
U.S. 531, 544 (1994)). 
128
 The Supreme Court has been especially solicitous of claims that it is necessary to protect traditional 
state power to regulate land and water use.  See, e.g., James R. May & Robert L. Glicksman, Justice 
Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental Law, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10585, 10600-
10602, 10603-04 (Aug. 2006) (describing the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Rehnquist).  It is possible that 
other areas of potential state regulation will fit less comfortably within the parameters of “traditional” state 
regulatory authority, and thus will invoke less judicial skepticism over federal efforts to intrude into the 
states’ regulatory realm. 
129
 Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 517 (1989). 
130
 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (protesting the 
majority’s “rejection of the Founders” considered judgment that politics, not judicial review, should 
mediate between state and national interests”); National League of Cities v. Usery, 422 U.S. 833, 876 
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist No. 45, at 311-12 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); 
The Federalist No. 46, at 317-18 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison)) (stating that “the political branches of 
our Government are structured to protect the interests of the States, as well as the Nation as a whole, and 
that the States are fully able to protect their own interests in the premises.  Congress is constituted of 
representatives in both the Senate and House Elected from the States.”).  See generally Notes, The Lesson 
of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Federalism’s Political Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609 (2005). 
131
 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). 
To be published at 26 Virginia Environmental Law Journal ___ (2007) 
Glicksman Page 31 7/8/2007 
C:\Word\articles\inactionpreemption2007.ssrn.doc 
ability of the states to protect their interests from what they regard as unwarranted federal 
intrusion. 
 
Indeed, of the two kinds of intrusion, the exercise of preemptive authority may be 
the more devastating to the integrity of state sovereignty than an expansive interpretation 
of the scope of the agency’s own regulatory authority.  The exercise of an enumerated 
federal regulatory power such as the Commerce Clause to adopt affirmative legislation 
does not necessarily result in exclusion of the state from the regulatory field.  Concurrent 
exercise of federal and state environmental regulation, for example, is the norm,132 unless 
state regulation actually conflicts with federal law.133  At the very least, federalism 
concerns ought to impel the courts to consistently apply a presumption against the 
conclusion that Congress delegated to a federal agency the power to preempt state law.134   
 
Even though the courts have not clearly enunciated a rule forbidding deference in 
the absence of an express delegation of authority to preempt, the result urged here is 
consistent with the approach courts have taken in inaction preemption cases,.  The 
Supreme Court stated in one case involving alleged preemption by federal inaction that 
“[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether Congress authorized or expected [state] regulation, 
but whether it indicated by its own actions to forbid it.”135  Similarly, to prove that 
Congress intended that agency inaction have preclusive impact, some lower courts have 
required Congress or the agency to declare “at a high level of specificity, its intention that 
its inaction preempt state law.”136  A requirement that Congress explicitly delegate to the 
agency the power to preempt is consistent with that means of avoiding preemption in the 
absence of clear congressional intent, as well as with the desirability of avoiding 
unwarranted infringements on state sovereignty and the protective exercise of traditional 
regulatory authority. 
 
Even if Congress has explicitly delegated to an agency the power to preempt state 
law in order to avoid frustration of federal purposes, however, the courts should not find 
preemption unless the agency has clearly exercised that power.  As one lower court put it, 
preemption by inaction “requires an actual, concrete assertion of regulatory authority as 
                                                 
132
 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (CAA). 
133
 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (FIFRA). 
134
 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (stating that, in assessing whether 
federal law preempts state common law, the Supreme Court “begins ‘with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the states were not to be superseded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress’”). 
135
 Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 387 n.11 (1983).  See 
also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 115 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Hillsborough County 
v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)) (applying principle that federal agencies “will 
make their intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive” in the context of an agency’s 
failure to regulate). 
136
 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 115 (3d Cir. 1988); Elston v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
74 P.3d 478, 488 (Colo. App. 2003) (requiring a “clear congressional directive”). 
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opposed to mere possession of authority.”137  More specifically, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that an agency’s failure to regulate has preemptive effect only where that failure 
“takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved 
pursuant to the policy of the statute.”138  Similarly, one lower court postulated that “there 
is a qualitative difference between a failure of a policymaker to act and a case where the 
policymaker evaluates a situation and then decides not to act ‘because [he or she has] 
determined it is appropriate to do nothing.’”139  It is only in the latter situation that a 
finding of conflict preemption due to frustration of federal purposes should ensue.140  
Inaction alone thus represents only “the absence of a real regulatory decision,” which 
should be afforded no preemptive effect.141  
 
An agency, just like Congress, may fail to regulate for myriad reasons, only one 
of which is its conclusion that unregulated activities best promote federal statutory 
policies.  An agency may decide not to regulate, for example, because it is awaiting more 
information before doing so.  Unless the agency that has been vested with the authority to 
preempt explicitly declares that its own decision not to regulate also bars states from 
doing so, the courts should not find conflict preemption based on interference with 
federal purposes.142  Under presidential administrations more protective of state 
regulatory authority than the George W. Bush administration has been, the agencies 
themselves have recognized the propriety of that approach.  NHTSA, for example, 
declared in 1995 that an agency’s decision not to regulate a particular activity will not 
“negatively” preempt state law unless the agency has “affirmatively manifested an 
intention to shut out State action.”143 
 
Finally, the existence and exercise of an agency’s delegated authority to declare 
its own failure to act to be preemptive of state regulation should not end the preemption 
inquiry.  The agency’s exercise of its authority to preempt state law based on its own 
refusal to regulate is subject to judicial review.  Although an authorized agency’s 
determination that preemption is needed to prevent frustration of federal objectives is 
entitled to judicial deference, the degree of deference depends on the manner in which the 
agency has exercised its authority.  The Supreme Court in Sprietsma stated that a federal 
                                                 
137
 Manes v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 801 F. Supp. 2d 954, 964 (D. Conn. 1992), aff’d, 990 F.2d 622 
(2d Cir. 1993) (Table) (quoting Donovan v. Red Star Marine Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 774, 778 (2d Cir. 1984)) 
(interpreting preemption provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)). 
138
 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York 
State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947)). 
139
 Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Missouri Pac. R.R. 
Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Texas, 833 F.2d 570, 576 (95th Cir. 1987), rehearing denied, 845 F.2d 1022 (5th 
Cir. 1988)).  See also Walker v. St. Louis-Sw. Ry. Co., 835 S.W. 2d 469, 473 (Mo. App. 1992). 
140
 See also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 346 F.3d 851, 868 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that agency deferral of regulation was insufficient to preempt state law because it did not represent 
a determination that no regulation was necessary). 
141
 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 116 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that EPA’s decision 
not to regulate noise from railroad refrigerator cars did not preempt state noise control standards). 
142
 See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Box, 2007 WL 1030320, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007). 
143
 Depatment of Transp., National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Consumer Information Regulations; 
Vehicle Stopping Distance, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,918 (June 26, 1995).  See also Depatment of Transp., National 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Low-Speed Vehicles , 65 Fed. Reg. 53,219 (Sept. 1, 2000).   
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agency’s enunciation of its position on the preemptive effect of federal inaction must be 
“authoritative” before inaction may be given preemptive effect.144  The Court has 
indicated more generally that agency determinations concerning the meaning or effect of 
the federal statutes they administer are entitled to Chevron-type deference145 from the 
courts if Congress has delegated to the agency the authority “to make rules carrying the 
force of law” and the agency’s determination represents the exercise of that authority.146  
If either of those conditions is not met, a more muted form of deference will apply.147  
Accordingly, the courts should lend greater credence to an agency’s determination that its 
inaction preempts state law if that determination is made in the course of a rulemaking 
proceeding in which the agency has invited and considered public comments before 
making its decision than if it took the position that its inaction preempted state law for the 
first time in the course of litigation or in issuing an internally distributed policy 
statement.148 
 
b. Does State Regulation of Activities that Contribute to 
Climate Change Conflict with Federal Purposes? 
 
 The approach to resolving claims of conflict preemption based on agency inaction 
described above leaves relatively little room for EPA to preempt state regulation of GHG 
emissions.  The CAA does not generally delegate to EPA the power to preempt state 
                                                 
144
 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 66 (2002) (quoting Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp., 461 
U.S. at 384).  See generally Ausness, supra note 58, at 969 (urging the Supreme Court to “refuse to allow 
administrative agencies to preempt state tort law unless they explicitly consider the preemption issue when 
formulating orders and regulations”). 
145
 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  In Chevron, the Court 
first enunciated its familiar two-part test for determining whether agency statutory interpretations are 
entitled to judicial deference: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43. 
146
 United States v. Mead Corp., 535 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
147
 Id. at 228 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)) (stating that deference will 
depend on the “persuasiveness of the agency’s position”).  Professor Mendelson has argued “that Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations of the preemptive effect of statutes is . . . inappropriate” because other 
institutions are more competent to assess the appropriate distribution of governmental authority and the 
value of preserving state regulatory authority, because “granting Chevron deference to agency preemption 
decisions may result in inadequately constrained decisionmaking processes,” and because “granting 
deference also might increase the risk that agencies would inappropriately expand their own authority at the 
expense of the states.”  Mendelson, supra note 15, at 742.  She also contends that the presumption against 
preemption should apply in cases involving agency preemptive judgments, but that Skidmore-type 
deference is appropriate if the agency’s preemptive determination has “the power to persuade.”  Id. 
148
 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (finding that “[d]eference to 
what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely 
inappropriate”). 
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law.149  As a result, EPA should not be able to declare any decision it makes not to 
regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources to be preemptive of state regulation.   
 
The statute does not exactly delegate to EPA the authority to preempt state 
regulation of motor vehicles either.  The statute itself preempts state law.150  The 
provision authorizing EPA to waive the prohibition on state regulation for California 
might reasonably be interpreted, however, as a delegation to EPA of the power to 
determine the preemptive scope of the CAA’s motor vehicle emission control provisions 
in limited contexts.151  If so, EPA has the authority to determine that California (and other 
states seeking to adopt California’s controls)152 may not regulate GHG emissions from 
motor vehicles, even though EPA has chosen not to do so.  Because the exercise of 
delegated authority to preempt state law is subject to judicial review, however, EPA 
would have to provide a convincing explanation that a decision to deny California’s 
waiver petition reflects a determination that state regulation is inappropriate because it 
would interfere with the CAA’s objectives.  EPA would have to convince a court, for 
example, that California’s regulation of GHG emissions would be more disruptive of 
federal purposes than that state’s regulation of other pollutants under the statute, which 
EPA has allowed.  One common reason for judicial reversal of agency decisions is a 
finding that the decisions are inconsistent with previous agency determinations and that 
the agency has failed adequately to explain the inconsistency.153 
 
  4. The Impact of the Lack of Federal Regulatory Authority 
 
 In the litigation between the auto industry and California concerning the 
preemptive impact of the CAA on the state’s efforts to regulate GHG emissions from 
motor vehicles, the industry argued that California’s controls on CO2 emissions were 
preempted by the CAA, even though at the time the industry made that argument, EPA 
professed to have no authority to regulate CO2 under the CAA.  The Supreme Court has 
since held that EPA does indeed have the authority to regulate CO2 and other GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA.154 
 
But industry’s argument made no sense at the time it was made.  The statute 
preempts states from adopting or enforcing standards relating to the control of motor 
vehicle emissions “subject to” the CAA.155  The motor vehicle emissions “subject to” the 
CAA’s emissions control provisions are those covered by EPA-issued “standards 
                                                 
149
 The CAA’s boilerplate delegation of authority to EPA to issue such regulations as are necessary to carry 
out its functions under the statute makes no reference to preemption.  42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1).  The 
provision regarding retention of state authority also makes no reference to agency preemptive judgments.  
Id. § 7416.  Nor does the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 32919, the statute that 
authorizes the Department of Transportation to issue corporate fuel economy standards, delegate to that 
agency the power to preempt state law. 
150
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
151
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
152
 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
153
 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-47 n.30 (1987). 
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 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
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applicable to the emission of any air pollutant” from motor vehicles which may cause or 
contribute to threats to the public health or welfare.156  If CO2 were not an air pollutant, 
as EPA and industry had claimed, EPA could not adopt a standard that controls CO2 
emissions, and those emissions therefore would not be “subject to” the CAA.  In other 
words, the CAA’s preemption provision simply would not apply to state controls on CO2 
emissions.  It is likely that state regulation of other activities over which federal agencies 
lack jurisdiction would be similarly exempt from express statutory preemption 
provisions. 
 
 This section considers more generally the impact of a federal agency’s lack of 
authority to regulate on a claim that state regulation is implicitly preempted by federal 
law.  Supreme Court decisions support the conclusion that a court should never interpret 
a federal law that fails to vest in an agency the authority to regulate activities being 
regulated by a state as implicitly preemptive of state regulation.  Even if the courts are 
not willing to adopt such an absolute rule, they should not afford any deference to an 
agency’s conclusion that a statute that fails to provide a federal agency with the authority 
to regulate activities subject to state regulation nevertheless preempts state regulation. 
 
a. Preemption by Inaction in the Absence of Federal 
Regulatory Authority 
 
 The courts should refuse to find implied preemption in cases in which the federal 
agency lacks jurisdiction over the activities being regulated by a state.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly recognized the inappropriateness of implied preemption based on 
the inaction of federal agencies that lack the power to regulate in areas subject to state 
regulation.  It has done so both in contexts in which Congress has never authorized 
federal regulation in the first place and in instances in which existing federal regulatory 
authority has been repealed. 
 
 In the Bethlehem Steel case,157 decided in the 1940s, the Court reasoned that if 
Congress enacts a statute that deals only partially with a particular subject, and leaves 
outside the scope of its delegation to a federal agency closely related matters, “it implies 
that in such matters federal policy is indifferent and . . . we can only assume it to be 
equally indifferent” to whether the state decides to regulate the activity excluded from 
federal regulation.158  The Court also stated that when Congress enacts statutes which 
initiate regulation of certain activities, “but where effective regulation must wait upon the 
[administrative] issuance of [federal] rules, . . . this Court has usually held that the police 
power of the state may be exercised” in the interval between adoption of the statute and 
issuance of federal regulations.159 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
157
 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) 
158
 Id. at 773.   
159
 Id. at 774.  The Court indicated that the validity of state regulation may depend on the 
comprehensiveness of a federal regulatory scheme as well as whether the state regulation covers a 
“separable or distinct segment of the matter covered by the federal statute.”  Id.  In the latter situation, if the 
federal agency has not acted on that segment, the states will be allowed to regulate.  Id.  See also H.P. 
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) (concluding that, “[p]lainly Congress by mere grant 
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The Court reached a similar result in a case involving federal and state regulation 
of rural electric rates in which the Federal Power Commission (FPC) decided that it 
lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wholesale rates charged by rural cooperatives.160 In 
Arkansas Electric Cooperative, the Court found that the FPC’s refusal to assert 
jurisdiction did not support preemption of state law because that refusal merely reflected 
the agency’s view that, “purely as a jurisdictional matter, the relevant statutes gave [the 
Rural Electrification Administration] exclusive authority among federal agencies to 
regulate rural power cooperatives.  It did not determine that, as a matter of policy, rural 
power cooperatives that are engaged in sales for resale should be left unregulated.”161  
Absent such a finding by Congress or the federal agency, the Court insisted, a court 
should not find preemption by inaction.  Finally, in the Puerto Rico Department case 
discussed above, the Court refused to attribute to Congress an intention to preempt state 
regulation of the petroleum industry when it terminated its earlier delegation of authority 
to the federal government to regulate the industry.  In the absence of textual evidence of 
Congress’s desire to preclude state regulation, the Court deemed it “impossible to find 
that a free market was mandated by federal law.”162 
 
All of these decisions support the conclusion that a federal statute that does not 
create federal authority to regulate the activities subject to state regulation lacks implicit 
preemptive impact on state law, whether the basis for the alleged preemption is 
occupation of the field or conflict due to frustration of federal purposes. 
 
b. Deference to the Preemptive Judgments of Agencies that 
Lack Regulatory Authority 
 
Even if the courts refuse to adopt an approach that precludes implied preemption 
in the absence of federal regulatory authority, judicial deference to the views of an 
agency lacking jurisdiction over the regulated state activities is inappropriate.  In 
particular, it is inappropriate when the issue is whether the federal government has 
occupied the field in which the state seeks to regulate as well as when the issue is 
whether state law would frustrate federal objectives.  In both contexts, the courts should 
afford no deference to a federal agency’s view that a statute vesting that agency with 
authority to regulate some activities, but not the ones subject to state regulation, was 
                                                                                                                                                 
of [unexercised] power to the Interstate Commerce Commission did not intend to supersede state police 
regulations established for the protection of the public using state highways”); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. 
v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm’n, 297 U.S. 471, 478-79, 480 (1936) (refusing to find that Congress intended 
“to preclude all regulation, state and national, of depreciation rates for telephone companies, for an 
indefinite time, until the Interstate Commerce Commission could act administratively to prescribe rates” 
and holding that, “[p]ending action by the . . . Commission establishing depreciation rates for telephone 
companies, state control over such rates remains unimpaired”); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 351 (1933) 
(interpreting statutory preemption of state bovine inspection authority to extend “only to cases where 
federal inspection has been made and certificate issued”). 
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meant to preempt state regulation in the area outside the realm of the agency’s regulatory 
authority. 
 
The justification the Supreme Court advanced in Chevron for judicial deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing is two-fold.  
First, Congress (implicitly) delegated to the agency the responsibility of interpreting gaps 
or ambiguities in the text.  Second, the agency has greater expertise than the reviewing 
court is likely to have and is therefore better able to understand the policy implications of 
the adoption of competing interpretations of the statute.163 
 
Neither of these justifications is likely to apply when an agency that lacks 
jurisdiction to regulate particular activities under a statute that does not contain an 
applicable express preemption provision concludes that Congress nevertheless intended 
to divest the states of the power to regulate those same activities.  If the federal agency 
lacks the authority to regulate the activities in question, then Congress has not delegated 
to it the power to make any determinations concerning those activities, including whether 
the statute was intended to preclude state regulation so that the activities can be 
conducted free of regulation.  Likewise, if the federal statute does not authorize the 
federal agency to regulate the activities the state seeks to regulate, the agency probably 
lacks the same kind of expertise concerning the policy implications of allowing state 
regulation that a federal agency with jurisdiction to control the activities being regulated 
by the state would normally have. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article argues that preemption of state regulation based on federal inaction is 
rarely appropriate.  It provides recommendations to guide Congress in determining 
whether federal inaction should preempt state law and to guide the courts in addressing 
whether such inaction does result in either express or implied preemption of state 
regulation.  In deference to state prerogatives in areas of traditional state concern such as 
protection of the public health and safety or the environment, Congress should not 
preempt state regulation in areas in which it has chosen not to regulate unless it 
determines that a state’s effort to address market failure through regulation would 
inappropriately impose adverse impacts on other states unable to protect their own 
interests or that federal policies can best be achieved in the absence of positive regulation 
at any level of government.  If Congress fails to enunciate in statutory text its desire to 
preempt state regulation in the absence of federal regulatory action, the courts should be 
very hesitant to find implied preemption, unless it is physically impossible to comply 
with both federal and state law.  A situation in which federal inaction and state regulation 
make simultaneous compliance with both regulatory regimes impossible will occur rarely 
because, by definition, the federal government has not prescribed or proscribed any 
conduct. 
 
The courts should confine the implied preemption doctrine in cases involving 
alleged preemption by inaction to the conflict branch of implied preemption.  Implicit 
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occupation of the field should never occur as a result of inaction.  The courts should be 
willing to find implied conflict preemption in the absence of federal regulatory action 
(other than a conflict based on physical impossibility) only if Congress has explicitly 
delegated to a federal agency the power to preempt state law to prevent it from subverting 
federal goals and the agency has clearly, authoritatively, and persuasively exercised that 
authority.  Finally, the courts should never find implied preemption of state regulation of 
activities that the relevant federal agency lacks the authority to regulate.  Even if the 
courts refuse to impose an absolute prohibition on implied preemption based on inaction 
by an agency with no authority to regulate, they should afford no deference to such an 
agency’s view that Congress intended to preempt state law. 
 
 These recommendations strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the 
federal government in pursuing policy objectives within the competence of federal power 
and the need to respect state sovereignty, especially in areas of traditional state 
regulation, to achieve the benefits of the dual system of government that the Framers 
built into the Constitution.  They also increase the chances that one level of government’s 
failure to take action to protect the public health and safety or the environment will not 
preclude another from doing so, while preserving the authority of the federal government 
to supersede the judgments of state policymakers in appropriate instances.164 
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 Cf. National Steel Corp. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 919 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1990) (characterizing it 
as “imprudent” to find preemption based on inaction when to do so would leave an “enormous industry” 
unregulated). 
